| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Confidentiality, Access Control
User's passwords may be revealed.
|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
Revealed passwords may be reused elsewhere to impersonate the users in question.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Use strong, non-reversible encryption to protect stored passwords.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 522 | Insufficiently Protected Credentials |
| PeerOf | Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 259 | Use of Hard-coded Password |
| PeerOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 798 | Use of Hard-coded Credentials |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 255 | Credentials Management Errors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1013 | Encrypt Data |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
Both of these examples verify a password by comparing it to a stored compressed version.
Because a compression algorithm is used instead of a one way hashing algorithm, an attacker can recover compressed passwords stored in the database.
Example 2
The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.
This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.
The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.
Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
A messaging platform serializes all elements of User/Group objects, making private information available to adversaries
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Primary
|
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
|
| Method | Details |
|---|---|
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness: High |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 963 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1348 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Maintenance
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Storing passwords in a recoverable format | ||
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP23 | Exposed Data |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-49 | Password Brute Forcing |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006年07月19日
(CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日) |
CLASP | |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年10月26日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Detection_Factors, Relationships | ||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes | ||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated References, Relationships | ||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | ||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
| 2014年06月23日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Other_Notes | ||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | ||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | ||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples | ||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations | ||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | ||
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