A System or System-on-Chip (SoC) that implements a boot process utilizing security mechanisms such as Root-of-Trust (RoT) typically starts by executing code from a Read-only-Memory (ROM) component. The code in ROM is immutable, hence any security vulnerabilities discovered in the ROM code can never be fixed for the systems that are already in use.
A common weakness is that the ROM does not have the ability to patch if security vulnerabilities are uncovered after the system gets shipped. This leaves the system in a vulnerable state where an adversary can compromise the SoC.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Varies by Context; Reduce Maintainability |
Scope: Other
Likelihood: High
When the system is unable to be patched, it can be left in a vulnerable state.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design; Implementation |
Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot.
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:
Some parts of the hardware initialization or signature verification done to authenticate patches will always be "not patchable."
|
|
Architecture and Design; Implementation |
Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:
Patches that use hardware fuses will have limitations in terms of size and the number of patches that can be supported. Note that some parts of the hardware initialization or signature verification done to authenticate patches will always be "not patchable."
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. | 1329 | Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1196 | Security Flow Issues |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | This issue could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and can be identified later during Testing. |
| Implementation | This issue could be introduced during implementation and can be identified later during Testing. |
| Integration | This issue could be introduced during integration and can be identified later during Testing. |
| Manufacturing | This issue could be introduced during manufacturing and can be identified later during Testing. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.
ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.
Example 2
The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.
The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396].
This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever.
A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1415 | Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-682 | Exploitation of Firmware or ROM Code with Unpatchable Vulnerabilities |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2020年04月25日
(CWE 4.3, 2020年12月10日) |
Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation |
| Contributions | ||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization |
| 2022年09月07日 | Jason Fung | Intel |
| suggested removal of incorrect references | ||
| 2023年11月29日 | Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Jeyavijayan Rajendran | Texas A&M University |
| suggested demonstrative example | ||
| 2023年11月29日 | Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi | Technical University of Darmstadt |
| suggested demonstrative example | ||
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, References | ||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2022年04月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | ||
| 2021年07月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes | ||
| 2021年03月15日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Maintenance_Notes | ||
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