Fuses are often used to store secret data, including security configuration data. When not blown, a fuse is considered to store a logic 0, and, when blown, it indicates a logic 1. Fuses are generally considered to be one-directional, i.e., once blown to logic 1, it cannot be reset to logic 0. However, if the logic used to determine system-security state (by leveraging the values sensed from the fuses) uses negative logic, an attacker might blow the fuse and drive the system to an insecure state.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control, Authorization |
|
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart |
Scope: Availability |
|
Read Memory |
Scope: Confidentiality |
|
Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands |
Scope: Integrity |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Logic should be designed in a way that blown fuses do not put the product into an insecure state that can be leveraged by an attacker.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 693 | Protection Mechanism Failure |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1199 | General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
A chip implements a secure boot and uses the sensed value of a fuse "do_secure_boot" to determine whether to perform a secure boot or not. If this fuse value is "0", the system performs secure boot. Otherwise, it does not perform secure boot.
An attacker blows the "do_secure_boot" fuse to "1". After reset, the attacker loads a custom bootloader, and, since the fuse value is now "1", the system does not perform secure boot, and the attacker can execute their custom firmware image.
Since by default, a fuse-configuration value is a "0", an attacker can blow it to a "1" with inexpensive hardware.
If the logic is reversed, an attacker cannot easily reset the fuse. Note that, with specialized and expensive equipment, an attacker with full physical access might be able to "unblow" the fuse value to a "0".
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1413 | Comprehensive Categorization: Protection Mechanism Failure |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Maintenance
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-74 | Manipulating State |
| Submissions | ||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2019年10月15日
(CWE 4.1, 2020年02月24日) |
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation |
| Modifications | ||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
| 2021年07月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description | ||
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