A System-on-Chip (SoC) comprises several components (IP) with varied trust requirements. It is required that each IP is identified uniquely and should distinguish itself from other entities in the SoC without any ambiguity. The unique secured identity is required for various purposes. Most of the time the identity is used to route a transaction or perform certain actions, including resetting, retrieving a sensitive information, and acting upon or on behalf of something else.
There are several variants of this weakness:
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism |
Scope: Access Control Likelihood: High |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Separation of Privilege Every identity generated in the SoC should be unique and immutable in hardware. The actions that an IP is trusted or not trusted should be clearly defined, implemented, configured, and tested. If the definition is implemented via a policy, then the policy should be immutable or protected with clear authentication and authorization. |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 657 | Violation of Secure Design Principles |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1198 | Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Implementation | |
| Operation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1418 | Comprehensive Categorization: Violation of Secure Design Principles |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-113 | Interface Manipulation |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2019年10月15日
(CWE 4.0, 2020年02月24日) |
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | |
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Name | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年12月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2024年02月29日 | System-on-Chip (SoC) Using Components without Unique, Immutable Identifiers | ||
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