It is widely supposed that David Hume (1711-1776) invented the regularity theory of causation, holding that causal relations are nothing but a matter of one type of thing being regularly followed by another. It is also widely supposed that he was quite right about this, and that it was one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. Galen Strawson argues in this book that the regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and that Hume never adopted it in any case. He explains that Hume did not claim that causation in the natural world is just a matter of regular succession, as such a dogmatic metaphysical claim about the nature of reality would have been utterly contrary to his fundamental philosophical principles. The author concludes that Hume claimed only that the regularity of succession was all that we could ever know of causation.
目次
Part 1 Meaning, scepticism and reality: the "Humean" view of causation
a summary of the argument
"objects" - preliminaries
the untenability of the realist regularity theory of causation
"objects" - complications
the notion of the ultimate nature of reality
Hume's strict scepticism
Hume's theory of ideas as applied to the idea of causation
the "AP" property
the problem of meaning
external objects and causation. Part 2 Causation in the "Treatise". Part 3 Causation in the "Enquiry": the question of irony
causation and inductive scepticism
the undiscovered and the undiscoverable
causation and human beings
the Occasionalists
the two definitions of cause. Part 4 Reason, reality and regularity: the meaning of "cause".