Message267616
| Author |
vstinner |
| Recipients |
Colm Buckley, doko, larry, lemburg, martin.panter, matejcik, ned.deily, python-dev, rhettinger, skrah, thomas-petazzoni, vstinner, ztane |
| Date |
2016年06月07日.10:14:35 |
| SpamBayes Score |
-1.0 |
| Marked as misclassified |
Yes |
| Message-id |
<1465294476.28.0.138546142865.issue26839@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| In-reply-to |
| Content |
Martin Panter (msg267504): "As I understand it, if there is no entropy initialized, this patch will fall back to reading /dev/urandom, which will return predictable data (opposite of "random" data!)."
No, I don't think so.
Linux uses a lot of random sources, but some of them are seen as untrusted as so are added with a very low estimation of their entropy. Linux even adds some random values with a estimation of 0 bit of entropy. For example, drivers can add serial numbers as random numbers.
So even if getrandom() blocks, if the urandom entropy pool is not considered as fully initialized yet, I expect that /dev/urandom still generates *random* numbers, even if these numbers are not suitable to generate cryptographic keys.
Please double check, I'm not sure of what I wrote :-)
See also http://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/ (but this article doesn't describe how urandom is initialized). |
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History
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| Date |
User |
Action |
Args |
| 2016年06月07日 10:14:36 | vstinner | set | recipients:
+ vstinner, lemburg, rhettinger, doko, larry, matejcik, ned.deily, skrah, python-dev, martin.panter, ztane, thomas-petazzoni, Colm Buckley |
| 2016年06月07日 10:14:36 | vstinner | set | messageid: <1465294476.28.0.138546142865.issue26839@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| 2016年06月07日 10:14:36 | vstinner | link | issue26839 messages |
| 2016年06月07日 10:14:35 | vstinner | create |
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