Message266721
| Author |
r.david.murray |
| Recipients |
r.david.murray, socketpair, vstinner |
| Date |
2016年05月30日.23:57:43 |
| SpamBayes Score |
-1.0 |
| Marked as misclassified |
Yes |
| Message-id |
<1464652663.15.0.205967385871.issue23459@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| In-reply-to |
| Content |
You can currently call os.execve with a file pointer. How is that different from adding an execveat with AS_EMPTY_PATH, functionally? I think we don't need to add this syscall, because it is intended to allow more robust implementation of fexecve, and we are already effectvely exposing fexecve. We should be able to assume that glibc will switch to using execveat under the hood, and not worry about it ourselves. If that's not true, then we can revisit this. |
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History
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| Date |
User |
Action |
Args |
| 2016年05月30日 23:57:43 | r.david.murray | set | recipients:
+ r.david.murray, vstinner, socketpair |
| 2016年05月30日 23:57:43 | r.david.murray | set | messageid: <1464652663.15.0.205967385871.issue23459@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| 2016年05月30日 23:57:43 | r.david.murray | link | issue23459 messages |
| 2016年05月30日 23:57:43 | r.david.murray | create |
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