Network Working Group M. Parthasarathy
Request for Comments: 4016 Nokia
Category: Informational March 2005
 Protocol for Carrying Authentication and Network Access (PANA)
 Threat Analysis and Security Requirements
Status of This Memo
 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
 memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
 This document discusses the threats to protocols used to carry
 authentication for network access. The security requirements arising
 from these threats will be used as additional input to the Protocol
 for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Working Group
 for designing the IP based network access authentication protocol.
Table of Contents
 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
 2. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
 3. Terminology and Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
 4. Usage Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 5. Trust Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 6. Threat Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 6.1. PAA Discovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 6.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 6.3. PaC Leaving the Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 6.4. Service Theft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 6.5. PAA-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 6.6. Miscellaneous Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 7. Summary of Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 8. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
 The Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
 Working Group is developing methods for authenticating clients to the
 access network using IP based protocols. This document discusses the
 threats to such IP based protocols.
 A client wishing to get access to the network must carry on multiple
 steps. First, it needs to discover the IP address of the PANA
 authentication agent (PAA) and then execute an authentication
 protocol to authenticate itself to the network. Once the client is
 authenticated, there might be other messages exchanged during the
 lifetime of the network access. This document discusses the threats
 in these steps without discussing any solutions. The requirements
 arising out of these threats will be used as input to the PANA
 Working Group. The use of word co-located in this document means
 that the referred entities are present on the same node.
2. Keywords
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
3. Terminology and Definitions
 Client Access Device
 A network element (e.g., notebook computer, PDA) that requires
 access to a provider's network.
 Network Access Server (NAS)
 Network device that provides access to the network.
 PANA Client (PaC)
 An entity in the edge subnet that seeks to obtain network access
 from a PANA authentication agent within a network. A PANA client
 is associated with a device and a set of credentials to prove its
 identity within the scope of PANA.
 PANA Authentication Agent (PAA)
 An entity whose responsibility is to authenticate the PANA client
 and to grant network access service to the client's device.
 Authentication Server (AS)
 An entity that authenticates the PANA client. It may be
 co-located with the PANA authentication agent or part of the
 back-end infrastructure.
 Device Identifier (DI)
 The identifier used by the network to control and police the
 network access of a client. Depending on the access technology,
 the identifier might contain the IP address, link-layer address,
 switch port number, etc., of a device. The PANA authentication
 agent keeps a table for binding device identifiers to the PANA
 clients. At most one PANA client should be associated with a DI
 on a PANA authentication agent.
 Enforcement Point (EP)
 A node capable of filtering packets sent by the PANA client by
 using the DI information authorized by PANA authentication agent.
 Compound methods
 Authentication protocol in which methods are used in a sequence
 one after another or in which methods are tunneled inside another
 independently established tunnel between the client and server
 [TUN-EAP].
4. Usage Scenarios
 PANA is intended to be used in an environment where there is no a
 priori trust relationship or security association between the PaC
 and other nodes, such as the PAA and EP. In these environments,
 one may observe the following:
 o The link between PaC and PAA may be a shared medium (e.g.,
 Ethernet) or may not be a shared medium (e.g., DSL network).
 o All the PaCs may be authenticated to the access network at
 layer 2 (e.g., 3GPP2 CDMA network) and share a security
 association with a layer 2 authentication agent (e.g., BTS).
 The PaCs still don't trust each other; any PaC can pretend to
 be a PAA, spoof IP addresses, and launch various other attacks.
 The scenarios mentioned above affect the threat model of PANA. This
 document discusses the various threats in the context of the above
 network access scenarios for a better understanding of the threats.
 In the following discussion, any reference to a link that is not
 shared (or non-shared) is assumed to be physically secure. If such
 an assumption cannot be made about the link, then the case becomes
 the same as that for a link being shared by more than one node.
5. Trust Relationships
 PANA authentication involves a client (PaC), a PANA agent (PAA), an
 Authentication server (AS), and an Enforcement point (EP). The AS
 here refers to the AAA server that resides in the home realm of the
 PaC.
 The entities that have a priori trust relationships before PANA
 begins are as follows:
 1) PAA and AS: The PaC belonging to the same administrative domain
 that the AS does often has to use resources provided by a PAA
 that belongs to another administrative domain. A PAA
 authenticates the PaC before providing local network access.
 The credentials provided by the PaC for authentication may or
 may not be understood by the PAA. If the PAA does not
 understand the credentials, it needs to communicate with the AS
 in a different domain to verify the credentials. The threats
 in the communication path between the PAA and AS are already
 covered in [RAD-EAP]. To counter these threats, the
 communication between the PAA and AS is secured by using a
 static or dynamic security association.
 2) PAA and EP: The PAA and EP belong to the same administrative
 domain. Hence, the network operator can set up a security
 association to protect the traffic exchanged between them.
 This document discusses the threats in this path.
 3) PaC and AS: The PaC and AS belong to the same administrative
 domain and share a trust relationship. When the PaC uses a
 different domain than its home for network access, it provides
 its credentials to the PAA in the visited network for
 authentication. The information provided by the PaC traverses
 the PaC-PAA and PAA-AS paths. The threats in the PAA-AS path
 are already discussed in [RAD-EAP]. This document discusses
 the threats in the PaC-PAA path.
 It is possible that some of the entities such as the PAA, AS, and EP
 are co-located. In those cases, it can be safely assumed that there
 are no significant external threats in their communication.
 The entities that do not have any trust relationship before PANA
 begins are as follows:
 1) PaC and PAA: The PaC and PAA normally belong to two different
 administrative domains. They do not necessarily share a trust
 relationship initially. They establish a security association
 in the process of authentication. All messages exchanged
 between the PaC and PAA are subject to various threats, which
 are discussed in this document.
 2) PaC and EP: The EP belongs to the same administrative domain as
 the PAA. Hence, the PaC and EP do not necessarily share a
 trust relationship initially. When the PaC is successfully
 authenticated, it may result in key establishment between the
 PaC and PAA, which can be further used to secure the link
 between the PaC and EP. For example, the EAP keying framework,
 [EAP-KEY], defines a three party EAP exchange in which the
 clients derive the transient sessions keys to secure the link
 between the peer and NAS in their final step. Similarly, PANA
 will provide the ability to establish keys between the PaC and
 EP that can be used to secure the link further. This is
 discussed further in Section 6.4 below.
6. Threat Scenarios
 First, the PaC needs to discover the PAA. This involves either
 sending solicitations or waiting for advertisements. Once it has
 discovered the PAA, the two will enter authentication exchange. Once
 the access is granted, the PaC will most likely exchange data with
 other nodes in the Internet. These steps are vulnerable to man-in-
 the-middle (MITM), denial of service (DoS), and service theft
 attacks, which are discussed below.
 The threats are grouped by the various stages the client goes through
 to gain access to the network. Section 6.1 discusses the threats
 related to PAA discovery. Section 6.2 discusses the threats related
 to authentication itself. Section 6.3 discusses the threats involved
 when leaving the network. Section 6.4 discusses service theft.
 Section 6.5 discusses the threats in the PAA-EP path. Section 6.6
 discusses the miscellaneous threats.
 Some of the threats discussed in the following sections may be
 specific to shared links. The threat may be absent on non-shared
 links. Hence, it is only required to prevent the threat on shared
 links. Instead of specifying a separate set of requirements for
 shared links and non-shared links, this document specifies one set of
 requirements with the following wording: "PANA MUST be able to
 prevent threat X". This means that the PANA protocol should be
 capable of preventing threat X. The feature that prevents threat X
 may or may not be used depending on the deployment.
6.1. PAA Discovery
 The PAA is discovered by sending solicitations or receiving
 advertisements. The following are possible threats.
 T6.1.1: A malicious node can pretend to be a PAA by sending a spoofed
 advertisement.
 In existing dial-up networks, the clients authenticate to the network
 but generally do not verify the authenticity of the messages coming
 from Network Access Server (NAS). This mostly works because the link
 between the device and the NAS is not shared with other nodes
 (assuming that nobody tampers with the physical link), and clients
 trust the NAS and the phone network to provide the service. Spoofing
 attacks are not present in this environment, as the PaC may assume
 that the other end of the link is the PAA.
 In environments where the link is shared, this threat is present, as
 any node can pretend to be a PAA. Even if the nodes are
 authenticated at layer 2, the threat remains present. It is
 difficult to protect the discovery process, as there is no a priori
 trust relationship between the PAA and PaC. In deployments where EP
 can police the packets that are sent among the PaCs, it is possible
 to filter out the unauthorized PANA packets (e.g., PAA advertisements
 sent by PaC) to prevent this threat.
 The advertisement may be used to include information (such as
 supported authentication methods) other than the discovery of the PAA
 itself. This can lead to a bidding down attack, as a malicious node
 can send a spoofed advertisement with capabilities that indicate
 authentication methods less secure than those that the real PAA
 supports, thereby fooling the PaC into negotiating an authentication
 method less secure than would otherwise be available.
 Requirement 1
 PANA MUST not assume that the discovery process is protected.
6.2. Authentication
 This section discusses the threats specific to the authentication
 protocol. Section 6.2.1 discusses the possible threat associated
 with success/failure indications that are transmitted to PaC at the
 end of the authentication. Section 6.2.2 discusses the man-in-the-
 middle attack when compound methods are used. Section 6.2.3
 discusses the replay attack, and Section 6.2.4 discusses the device
 identifier attack.
6.2.1. Success or Failure Indications
 Some authentication protocols (e.g., EAP) have a special message to
 indicate success or failure. An attacker can send a false
 authentication success or failure message to the PaC. By sending a
 false failure message, the attacker can prevent the client from
 accessing the network. By sending a false success message, the
 attacker can prematurely end the authentication exchange, effectively
 denying service for the PaC.
 If the link is not shared, then this threat is absent, as ingress
 filtering can prevent the attacker from impersonating the PAA.
 If the link is shared, it is easy to spoof these packets. If layer 2
 provides per-packet encryption with pair-wise keys, it might make it
 hard for the attacker to guess the success or failure packet that the
 client would accept. Even if the node is already authenticated at
 layer 2, it can still pretend to be a PAA and spoof the success or
 failure.
 This attack is possible if the success or failure indication is not
 protected by using a security association between the PaC and the
 PAA. In order to avoid this attack, the PaC and PAA should mutually
 authenticate each other. In this process, they should be able to
 establish keys to protect the success or failure indications. It may
 not always be possible to protect the indication, as the keys may not
 be established prior to transmitting the success or failure packet.
 If the client is re-authenticating to the network, it can use the
 previously established security association to protect the success or
 failure indications. Similarly, all PANA messages exchanged during
 the authentication prior to key establishment may not be protected.
 Requirement 2
 PANA MUST be able to mutually authenticate the PaC and PAA. PANA
 MUST be able to establish keys between the PaC and PAA to protect the
 PANA messages.
6.2.2. MITM Attack
 A malicious node can claim to be the PAA to the real PaC and claim to
 be the PaC to the real PAA. This is a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
 attack, whereby the PaC is fooled to think that it is communicating
 with the real PAA and the PAA is fooled to think that it is
 communicating with the real PaC.
 If the link is not shared, this threat is absent, as ingress
 filtering can prevent the attacker from acting as a man-in-the-
 middle.
 If the link is shared, this threat is present. Even if the layer 2
 provides per-packet protection, the attacker can act as a man-in-
 the-middle and launch this attack. An instance of MITM attack, in
 which compound authentication methods are used is described in
 [TUN-EAP]. In these attacks, the server first authenticates to the
 client. As the client has not proven its identity yet, the server
 acts as the man-in-the-middle, tunneling the identity of the
 legitimate client to gain access to the network. The attack is
 possible because there is no verification that the same entities
 participated among the compound methods. It is not possible to do
 such verification if compound methods are used without being able to
 create a cryptographic binding among them. This implies that PANA
 will be vulnerable to such attacks if compound methods are used
 without being able to cryptographically bind them. Note that the
 attack does not exist if the keys derived during the tunnel
 establishment are not used to authenticate the client (e.g., tunnel
 keys are used for just protecting the identity of the client).
 Requirement 3
 When compound authentication methods are used in PANA, the methods
 MUST be cryptographically bound.
6.2.3. Replay Attack
 A malicious node can replay the messages that caused authentication
 failure or success at a later time to create false failures or
 success. The attacker can also potentially replay other messages of
 the PANA protocol to deny service to the PaC.
 If the link is not shared, this threat is absent, as ingress
 filtering can prevent the attacker from impersonating the PAA to
 replay the packets.
 If the link is shared, this threat is present. If the packets are
 encrypted at layer 2 by using pair-wise keys, it will make it hard
 for the attacker to learn the unencrypted (i.e., original) packet
 that needs to be replayed. Even if layer 2 provides replay
 protection, the attacker can still replay the PANA messages (layer 3)
 for denying service to the client.
 Requirement 4
 PANA MUST be able to protect itself against replay attacks.
6.2.4. Device Identifier Attack
 When the client is successfully authenticated, the PAA sends access
 control information to the EP for granting access to the network.
 The access control information typically contains the device
 identifier of the PaC, which is either obtained from the IP headers
 and MAC headers of the packets exchanged during the authentication
 process or carried explicitly in the PANA protocol field. The
 attacker can gain unauthorized access into the network by taking the
 following steps.
 o An attacker pretends to be a PAA and sends advertisements. The
 PaC is fooled and starts exchanging packets with the attacker.
 o The attacker modifies the IP source address on the packet,
 adjusts the UDP/TCP checksum, and forwards the packet to the
 real PAA. It also does the same on return packets.
 o When the real PaC is successfully authenticated, the attacker
 gains access to the network, as the packets contained the IP
 address (and potentially the MAC address also) of the attacker.
 If the link is not shared, this threat is absent, as the attacker
 cannot impersonate the PAA and intercept the packets from the PaC.
 If the link is shared, this threat is present. If the layer 2
 provides per-packet protection, it is not possible to change the MAC
 address, and hence this threat may be absent in such cases if EP
 filters on both the IP and MAC address.
 Requirement 5
 PANA MUST be able to protect the device identifier against spoofing
 when it is exchanged between the PaC and PAA.
6.3. PaC Leaving the Network
 When the PaC leaves the network, it can inform the PAA before
 disconnecting from the network so that the resources used by PaC can
 be accounted properly. The PAA may also choose to revoke the access
 anytime it deems necessary. The following are possible threats:
 T6.3.1: A malicious node can pretend to be a PAA and revoke the
 access to PaC.
 T6.3.2: A malicious node can pretend to be a real PaC and transmit a
 disconnect message.
 T6.3.3: The PaC can leave the network without notifying the PAA or EP
 (e.g., the Ethernet cable is unplugged, system crash). An
 attacker can pretend to be the PaC and start using the
 network.
 If the link is not shared, threats T6.3.1 and T6.3.2 are absent.
 Threat T6.3.3 may still be present. If there is no layer 2
 indication, or if the layer 2 indication cannot be relied upon, then
 threat T6.3.3 is still present on non-shared links.
 If the link is shared, all of the above threats are present, as any
 node on the link can spoof the disconnect message. Even if layer 2
 has per-packet authentication, the attacker can pretend to be a PaC
 (e.g., by spoofing the IP address) and disconnect from the network.
 Similarly, any node can pretend to be a PAA and revoke the access to
 the PaC. Therefore, T6.3.1 and T6.3.2 are possible even on links
 where layer 2 is secured. Threat T6.3.3 can be prevented if layer 2
 provides per-packet authentication. The attacker cannot subsume the
 PaC that left the network without knowing the keys that protect the
 packet at layer 2.
 Requirement 6
 PANA MUST be able to protect disconnect and revocation messages.
 PANA MUST NOT depend on the PaC sending a disconnect message.
6.4. Service Theft
 An attacker can gain unauthorized access into the network by stealing
 the service from another client. Once the real PaC is successfully
 authenticated, the EP will have filters in place to prevent
 unauthorized access into the network. The filters will be based on
 something that will be carried on every packet. For example, the
 filter could be based on the IP and MAC addresses, where the packets
 will be dropped unless the packets coming with certain IP addresses
 also match the MAC addresses. The following are possible threats:
 T6.4.1: An attacker can spoof both the IP and MAC addresses of an
 authorized client to gain unauthorized access. The attacker
 can launch this attack easily by just sniffing the wire for
 IP and MAC addresses. This lets the attacker use the network
 without any authorization, getting a free service.
 T6.4.2: The PaC can leave the network without notifying the PAA or EP
 (e.g., the Ethernet cable is unplugged, system crash). An
 attacker can pretend to be the PaC and start using the
 network.
 Service theft allows the possibility of exploiting the weakness in
 other authentication protocols that use IP address for
 authentication. It also allows the interception of traffic destined
 for other nodes by spoofing the IP address.
 If the link is not shared, T6.4.1 is absent, as there is only one
 client on the link, and ingress filtering can prevent the use of the
 authorized IP and MAC addresses by the attacker on another link.
 Threat T6.4.2 exists, as the attacker can use the IP or MAC address
 of the real PaC to gain access to the network.
 If the link is shared, both the threats are present. If layer 2
 provides per-packet protection using pair-wise keys, both the threats
 can be prevented.
 Requirement 7
 PANA MUST securely bind the authenticated session to the device
 identifier of the client, to prevent service theft. PANA MUST be
 able to bootstrap a shared secret between the PaC and PAA that can be
 further used to set up a security association between the PaC and EP
 to provide cryptographic protection against service theft.
6.5. PAA-EP Communication
 After a successful authentication, the PAA needs to communicate the
 access control information of the PaC to the EP so that the PaC will
 be allowed to access the network. The information communicated would
 contain at least the device identifier of the PaC. If strong
 security is needed, the PAA will communicate a shared secret known
 only to the PaC and PAA, for setting up a security association
 between the PaC and EP. The following are possible threats:
 T6.5.1: An attacker can eavesdrop to learn the information
 communicated between the PAA and EP. The attacker can
 further use this information to spoof the real PaC and also
 to set up security association for gaining access to the
 network. This threat is absent if the attacker cannot
 eavesdrop on the link; e.g., the PAA and EP communicate on a
 link separate from that of visiting PaCs.
 T6.5.2: An attacker can pretend to be a PAA and send false
 information to an EP to gain access to the network. In the
 case of stronger security, the attacker has to send its own
 device identifier and also a shared secret, so that the EP
 will let the attacker access the network.
 If the communication between the PAA and EP is protected, these
 threats are absent.
 Requirement 8
 The communication between the PAA and EP MUST be protected against
 eavesdropping and spoofing attacks.
6.6. Miscellaneous Attacks
 T6.6.1: There are various forms of DoS attacks that can be launched
 on the PAA or AS. A few are mentioned below. As it is hard
 to defend against some of the DoS attacks, the protocol
 should be designed carefully to mitigate or prevent such
 attacks.
 o An attacker can bombard the PAA with lots of
 authentication requests. If the PAA and AS are not co-
 located, the PAA may have to allocate resources to store
 some state about the PaC locally before it receives the
 response from the back-end AS. This can deplete memory
 resources on the PAA.
 o With minimal effort, an attacker can force the PAA or AS
 to make computationally intensive operations with minimal
 effort, that can deplete the CPU resources of the PAA or
 AS.
 T6.6.2: PaC acquires an IP address by using stateful or stateless
 mechanisms before PANA authentication begins [PANAREQ]. When
 the IP addresses are assigned before the client
 authentication, it opens up the possibility of DoS attacks in
 which unauthenticated malicious nodes can deplete the IP
 address space by acquiring multiple IP addresses or deny
 allocation to others by responding to every duplicate address
 detection (DAD) query.
 Depleting a /64 IPv6 link-local address space or a /8 RFC1918
 private address space requires a brute-force attack. Such an
 attack is part of a DoS class that can equally target the
 link capacity or the CPU cycles on the target system by
 bombarding arbitrary packets. Therefore, solely handling the
 IP address depletion attack is not going to improve the
 security, as a more general solution is needed to tackle the
 whole class of brute-force attacks.
 The DAD attack can be prevented by deploying secure address
 resolution that does not depend on the client authentication,
 such as [SEND]. The attack may also be prevented if the EP
 is placed between the PaCs to monitor the ND/ARP activity and
 to detect DAD attacks (excessive NA/ARP replies). If none of
 these solutions are applicable to a deployment, the PaCs can
 send arbitrary packets to each other without going through
 the EP, which enables a class of attacks that are based on
 interfering with the PANA messaging (See T6.1.1). Since
 there will always be a threat in this class (e.g., insecure
 discovery), it is not going to improve the overall security
 by addressing DAD.
7. Summary of Requirements
 1. PANA MUST not assume that the discovery process is protected.
 2. PANA MUST be able to mutually authenticate the PaC and PAA. PANA
 MUST be able to establish keys between the PaC and PAA to protect
 the PANA messages.
 3. When compound authentication methods are used in PANA, the methods
 MUST be cryptographically bound.
 4. PANA MUST be able to protect itself against replay attacks.
 5. PANA MUST be able to protect the device identifier against
 spoofing when it is exchanged between the PaC and PAA.
 6. PANA MUST be able to protect disconnect and revocation messages.
 PANA MUST NOT depend on whether the PaC sends a disconnect
 message.
 7. PANA MUST securely bind the authenticated session to the device
 identifier of the client, to prevent service theft. PANA MUST be
 able to bootstrap a shared secret between the PaC and PAA that can
 be further used to set up a security association between the PaC
 and EP to provide cryptographic protection against service theft.
 8. The communication between the PAA and EP MUST be protected against
 eavesdropping and spoofing attacks.
8. Security Considerations
 This document discusses various threats with IP based network access
 authentication protocol. Though this document discusses the threats
 for shared and unshared links separately, it may be difficult to make
 such a distinction in practice (e.g., a dial-up link may be a point-
 to-point IP tunnel). Hence, the link should be assumed to be a
 shared link for most of the threats in this document.
9. Normative References
 [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10. Informative References
 [PANAREQ] Yegin, A., Ed., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and
 C. Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
 Network Access (PANA) Requirements and Terminology",
 Work in Progress, August 2004.
 [EAP-KEY] Aboba, B., et al., "EAP keying framework", Work in
 Progress.
 [RAD-EAP] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
 Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
 September 2003.
 [TUN-EAP] Puthenkulam, J., et al., "The compound authentication
 binding problem", Work in Progress.
 [SEND] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
 "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March
 2005.
11. Acknowledgements
 The author would like to thank the following people (in no specific
 order) for providing valuable comments: Alper Yegin, Basavaraj Patil,
 Pekka Nikander, Bernard Aboba, Francis Dupont, Michael Thomas,
 Yoshihiro Ohba, Gabriel Montenegro, Tschofenig Hannes, Bill
 Sommerfeld, N. Asokan, Pete McCan, Derek Atkins, and Thomas Narten.
Author's Address
 Mohan Parthasarathy
 Nokia
 313 Fairchild Drive
 Mountain View, CA-94303
 EMail: mohanp@sbcglobal.net
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