xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/5] Add MSI support to XEN
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To: |
"Jiang, Yunhong" <yunhong.jiang@xxxxxxxxx>, "Shan, Haitao" <haitao.shan@xxxxxxxxx>, Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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Subject: |
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/5] Add MSI support to XEN |
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From: |
Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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Date: |
2008年3月28日 09:45:27 +0000 |
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Cc: |
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, "Li, Xin B" <xin.b.li@xxxxxxxxx> |
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2008年3月28日 02:47:09 -0700 |
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[Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/5] Add MSI support to XEN |
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On 28/3/08 09:37, "Jiang, Yunhong" <yunhong.jiang@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> DomainU (PV and hvm) should have no idea of vector. Do you think it
> will matter if domain0 have such idea?
> one thing missed here is, if domainU want to access the MSI config
> spafce, pci backend should return 0xff. Then it should be secure if
> domain0 can have idea of vector.
No, it's not a security risk for dom0 kernel to know about real vectors.
It's already part of the TCB.
It's just a question of which is the cleanest design. And letting Xen get
some access to PCI config space (just a little -- not a lot -- and under
direction of dom0 kernel) will let it properly mask MSIs, which would be a
nicer and deadlock-free alternative to the 'ACK-NEW' masking method.
-- Keir
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