musl/src/misc/syslog.c, branch master musl - an implementation of the standard library for Linux-based systems syslog: revert LOG_FAC/LOG_FACMASK changes 2024年07月05日T17:22:25+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2024年07月05日T17:22:25+00:00 dd1e63c3638d5f9afb857fccf6ce1415ca5f1b8b commit 895736d49bd2bb318c69de99a05ea70c035c2da9 made these changes along with fixing a real bug in LOG_MAKEPRI. based on further information, they do not seem to be well-motivated or in line with policy. the result of LOG_FAC is not a meaningful facility value if we shift it down like before, but apparently the way it is used by applications is as an index into an array of facility names. moreover, all historical systems which define it do so with the shift. as it is a nonstandard interface, there is no justification for providing a macro by the same name that is incompatible with historical practice. the value of LOG_FACMASK likewise is 0x3f8 on all historical systems checked. while only 5 bits are used for existing facility codes, the convention seems to be that all 7 bits belong to the facility field and theoretically could be used to expand to having more facilities. that seems unlikely to happen, but there is no reason to make a gratuitously incompatible change here.
commit 895736d49bd2bb318c69de99a05ea70c035c2da9 made these changes
along with fixing a real bug in LOG_MAKEPRI. based on further
information, they do not seem to be well-motivated or in line with
policy.
the result of LOG_FAC is not a meaningful facility value if we shift
it down like before, but apparently the way it is used by applications
is as an index into an array of facility names. moreover, all
historical systems which define it do so with the shift. as it is a
nonstandard interface, there is no justification for providing a macro
by the same name that is incompatible with historical practice.
the value of LOG_FACMASK likewise is 0x3f8 on all historical systems
checked. while only 5 bits are used for existing facility codes, the
convention seems to be that all 7 bits belong to the facility field
and theoretically could be used to expand to having more facilities.
that seems unlikely to happen, but there is no reason to make a
gratuitously incompatible change here.
syslog: fix incorrect LOG_MAKEPRI and LOG_FAC[MASK] macros 2024年06月13日T15:48:40+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2024年06月13日T15:48:40+00:00 895736d49bd2bb318c69de99a05ea70c035c2da9 these are nonstandard and unnecessary for using the associated functionality, but resulted in applications that used them malfunctioning. patch based on proposed fix by erny hombre.
these are nonstandard and unnecessary for using the associated
functionality, but resulted in applications that used them
malfunctioning.
patch based on proposed fix by erny hombre.
syslog: use C locale for timestamp generation 2024年02月07日T21:08:11+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2024年02月07日T21:08:11+00:00 39838619bb8b65a8897abcfda8c17ad6de0115d8 depending on contents of the LC_TIME locale, log messages could be malformatted (especially if the ABMON strings contain non-alphabetic characters) or the subsequent code could invoke undefined behavior, via passing a timebuf[] with unspecified contents to snprintf, if the translated ABMON string did not fit in the 16-byte timebuf. this does not appear to be a security-relevant bug, as locale loading functionality is intentionally not available to set*id programs -- the MUSL_LOCPATH environment variable is ignored when libc.secure is true, and custom locales are not loadable without it.
depending on contents of the LC_TIME locale, log messages could be
malformatted (especially if the ABMON strings contain non-alphabetic
characters) or the subsequent code could invoke undefined behavior,
via passing a timebuf[] with unspecified contents to snprintf, if
the translated ABMON string did not fit in the 16-byte timebuf.
this does not appear to be a security-relevant bug, as locale loading
functionality is intentionally not available to set*id programs -- the
MUSL_LOCPATH environment variable is ignored when libc.secure is true,
and custom locales are not loadable without it.
lift child restrictions after multi-threaded fork 2020年11月11日T20:55:30+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2020年11月11日T18:37:33+00:00 167390f05564e0a4d3fcb4329377fd7743267560 as the outcome of Austin Group tracker issue #62, future editions of POSIX have dropped the requirement that fork be AS-safe. this allows but does not require implementations to synchronize fork with internal locks and give forked children of multithreaded parents a partly or fully unrestricted execution environment where they can continue to use the standard library (per POSIX, they can only portably use AS-safe functions). up until recently, taking this allowance did not seem desirable. however, commit 8ed2bd8bfcb4ea6448afb55a941f4b5b2b0398c0 exposed the extent to which applications and libraries are depending on the ability to use malloc and other non-AS-safe interfaces in MT-forked children, by converting latent very-low-probability catastrophic state corruption into predictable deadlock. dealing with the fallout has been a huge burden for users/distros. while it looks like most of the non-portable usage in applications could be fixed given sufficient effort, at least some of it seems to occur in language runtimes which are exposing the ability to run unrestricted code in the child as part of the contract with the programmer. any attempt at fixing such contracts is not just a technical problem but a social one, and is probably not tractable. this patch extends the fork function to take locks for all libc singletons in the parent, and release or reset those locks in the child, so that when the underlying fork operation takes place, the state protected by these locks is consistent and ready for the child to use. locking is skipped in the case where the parent is single-threaded so as not to interfere with legacy AS-safety property of fork in single-threaded programs. lock order is mostly arbitrary, but the malloc locks (including bump allocator in case it's used) must be taken after the locks on any subsystems that might use malloc, and non-AS-safe locks cannot be taken while the thread list lock is held, imposing a requirement that it be taken last.
as the outcome of Austin Group tracker issue #62, future editions of
POSIX have dropped the requirement that fork be AS-safe. this allows
but does not require implementations to synchronize fork with internal
locks and give forked children of multithreaded parents a partly or
fully unrestricted execution environment where they can continue to
use the standard library (per POSIX, they can only portably use
AS-safe functions).
up until recently, taking this allowance did not seem desirable.
however, commit 8ed2bd8bfcb4ea6448afb55a941f4b5b2b0398c0 exposed the
extent to which applications and libraries are depending on the
ability to use malloc and other non-AS-safe interfaces in MT-forked
children, by converting latent very-low-probability catastrophic state
corruption into predictable deadlock. dealing with the fallout has
been a huge burden for users/distros.
while it looks like most of the non-portable usage in applications
could be fixed given sufficient effort, at least some of it seems to
occur in language runtimes which are exposing the ability to run
unrestricted code in the child as part of the contract with the
programmer. any attempt at fixing such contracts is not just a
technical problem but a social one, and is probably not tractable.
this patch extends the fork function to take locks for all libc
singletons in the parent, and release or reset those locks in the
child, so that when the underlying fork operation takes place, the
state protected by these locks is consistent and ready for the child
to use. locking is skipped in the case where the parent is
single-threaded so as not to interfere with legacy AS-safety property
of fork in single-threaded programs. lock order is mostly arbitrary,
but the malloc locks (including bump allocator in case it's used) must
be taken after the locks on any subsystems that might use malloc, and
non-AS-safe locks cannot be taken while the thread list lock is held,
imposing a requirement that it be taken last.
split internal lock API out of libc.h, creating lock.h 2018年09月12日T22:40:35+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2018年09月12日T14:19:54+00:00 5f12ffe1239a5e4f8d4e98e2dff4e191a71f4693 this further reduces the number of source files which need to include libc.h and thereby be potentially exposed to libc global state and internals. this will also facilitate further improvements like adding an inline fast-path, if we want to do so later.
this further reduces the number of source files which need to include
libc.h and thereby be potentially exposed to libc global state and
internals.
this will also facilitate further improvements like adding an inline
fast-path, if we want to do so later.
remove or make static various unused __-prefixed symbols 2018年09月12日T18:34:35+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2018年09月11日T18:02:58+00:00 3fe595de83e398dbc3cdbe303cacaf8485c9ae08
revise the definition of multiple basic locks in the code 2018年01月09日T18:15:27+00:00 Jens Gustedt Jens.Gustedt@inria.fr 2018年01月03日T13:17:12+00:00 32482f61da7650ff10741bd5aedd66bbc3ea165b In all cases this is just a change from two volatile int to one.
In all cases this is just a change from two volatile int to one.
handle loss of syslog socket connection 2015年07月09日T18:47:48+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2015年07月09日T18:36:02+00:00 0f9c2666aca95eb98eb0ef4f4d8d1473c8ce3fa0 when traditional syslogd implementations are restarted, the old server socket ceases to exist and a new unix socket with the same pathname is created. when this happens, the default destination address associated with the client socket via connect is no longer valid, and attempts to send produce errors. this happens despite the socket being datagram type, and is in contrast to the behavior that would be seen with an IP datagram (UDP) socket. in order to avoid a situation where the application is unable to send further syslog messages without calling closelog, this patch makes syslog attempt to reconnect the socket when send returns an error indicating a lost connection. additionally, initial failure to connect the socket no longer results in the socket being closed. this ensures that an application which calls openlog to reserve the socket file descriptor will not run into a situation where transient connection failure (e.g. due to syslogd restart) prevents fd reservation. however, applications which may be unable to connect the socket later (e.g. due to chroot, restricted permissions, seccomp, etc.) will still fail to log if the syslog socket cannot be connected at openlog time or if it has to be reconnected later.
when traditional syslogd implementations are restarted, the old server
socket ceases to exist and a new unix socket with the same pathname is
created. when this happens, the default destination address associated
with the client socket via connect is no longer valid, and attempts to
send produce errors. this happens despite the socket being datagram
type, and is in contrast to the behavior that would be seen with an IP
datagram (UDP) socket.
in order to avoid a situation where the application is unable to send
further syslog messages without calling closelog, this patch makes
syslog attempt to reconnect the socket when send returns an error
indicating a lost connection.
additionally, initial failure to connect the socket no longer results
in the socket being closed. this ensures that an application which
calls openlog to reserve the socket file descriptor will not run into
a situation where transient connection failure (e.g. due to syslogd
restart) prevents fd reservation. however, applications which may be
unable to connect the socket later (e.g. due to chroot, restricted
permissions, seccomp, etc.) will still fail to log if the syslog
socket cannot be connected at openlog time or if it has to be
reconnected later.
eliminate atomics in syslog setlogmask function 2015年03月04日T14:44:43+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2015年03月04日T14:44:43+00:00 6de071a0be00ec2ff08af3c89c7caaa20f1044d7
make all objects used with atomic operations volatile 2015年03月04日T03:50:02+00:00 Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx 2015年03月04日T03:50:02+00:00 56fbaa3bbe73f12af2bfbbcf2adb196e6f9fe264 the memory model we use internally for atomics permits plain loads of values which may be subject to concurrent modification without requiring that a special load function be used. since a compiler is free to make transformations that alter the number of loads or the way in which loads are performed, the compiler is theoretically free to break this usage. the most obvious concern is with atomic cas constructs: something of the form tmp=*p;a_cas(p,tmp,f(tmp)); could be transformed to a_cas(p,*p,f(*p)); where the latter is intended to show multiple loads of *p whose resulting values might fail to be equal; this would break the atomicity of the whole operation. but even more fundamental breakage is possible. with the changes being made now, objects that may be modified by atomics are modeled as volatile, and the atomic operations performed on them by other threads are modeled as asynchronous stores by hardware which happens to be acting on the request of another thread. such modeling of course does not itself address memory synchronization between cores/cpus, but that aspect was already handled. this all seems less than ideal, but it's the best we can do without mandating a C11 compiler and using the C11 model for atomics. in the case of pthread_once_t, the ABI type of the underlying object is not volatile-qualified. so we are assuming that accessing the object through a volatile-qualified lvalue via casts yields volatile access semantics. the language of the C standard is somewhat unclear on this matter, but this is an assumption the linux kernel also makes, and seems to be the correct interpretation of the standard.
the memory model we use internally for atomics permits plain loads of
values which may be subject to concurrent modification without
requiring that a special load function be used. since a compiler is
free to make transformations that alter the number of loads or the way
in which loads are performed, the compiler is theoretically free to
break this usage. the most obvious concern is with atomic cas
constructs: something of the form tmp=*p;a_cas(p,tmp,f(tmp)); could be
transformed to a_cas(p,*p,f(*p)); where the latter is intended to show
multiple loads of *p whose resulting values might fail to be equal;
this would break the atomicity of the whole operation. but even more
fundamental breakage is possible.
with the changes being made now, objects that may be modified by
atomics are modeled as volatile, and the atomic operations performed
on them by other threads are modeled as asynchronous stores by
hardware which happens to be acting on the request of another thread.
such modeling of course does not itself address memory synchronization
between cores/cpus, but that aspect was already handled. this all
seems less than ideal, but it's the best we can do without mandating a
C11 compiler and using the C11 model for atomics.
in the case of pthread_once_t, the ABI type of the underlying object
is not volatile-qualified. so we are assuming that accessing the
object through a volatile-qualified lvalue via casts yields volatile
access semantics. the language of the C standard is somewhat unclear
on this matter, but this is an assumption the linux kernel also makes,
and seems to be the correct interpretation of the standard.

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