| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
The user may be redirected to an untrusted page
that contains malware which may then compromise the
user's system. In some cases, an open redirect can also
enable the immediate download of a file without the
user's permission, because the redirection to an
external site may lead to endpoints on those sites that
automatically trigger a download action ("drive-by
download" [REF-1478]). This will expose the user to
extensive risk. The user's interaction with the web
server may also be compromised if the malware conducts
keylogging or other attacks that steal credentials,
personally identifiable information (PII), or other
important data.
|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Other |
Scope: Access Control, Confidentiality, Other
By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam. The user may be subjected to phishing attacks by being redirected to an untrusted page. The phishing attack may point to an attacker controlled web page that appears to be a trusted web site. The phishers may then steal the user's credentials and then use these credentials to access the legitimate web site. Because the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site, phishing attempts have a more trustworthy appearance.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection. |
|
Architecture and Design |
Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability. |
|
Architecture and Design |
Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).
Note:
Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).
|
|
Architecture and Design; Implementation |
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields. |
|
Operation |
Strategy: Firewall Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:
An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 610 | Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 19 | Data Processing Errors |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. | 610 | Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1019 | Validate Inputs |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase. |
| Implementation |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
The following code obtains a URL from the query string and then redirects the user to that URL.
The problem with the above code is that an attacker could use this page as part of a phishing scam by redirecting users to a malicious site. For example, assume the above code is in the file example.php. An attacker could supply a user with the following link:
The user sees the link pointing to the original trusted site (example.com) and does not realize the redirection that could take place.
Example 2
The following code is a Java servlet that will receive a GET request with a url parameter in the request to redirect the browser to the address specified in the url parameter. The servlet will retrieve the url parameter value from the request and send a response to redirect the browser to the url address.
The problem with this Java servlet code is that an attacker could use the RedirectServlet as part of an e-mail phishing scam to redirect users to a malicious site. An attacker could send an HTML formatted e-mail directing the user to log into their account by including in the e-mail the following link:
The user may assume that the link is safe since the URL starts with their trusted bank, bank.example.com. However, the user will then be redirected to the attacker's web site (attacker.example.net) which the attacker may have made to appear very similar to bank.example.com. The user may then unwittingly enter credentials into the attacker's web page and compromise their bank account. A Java servlet should never redirect a user to a URL without verifying that the redirect address is a trusted site.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
URL parameter loads the URL into a frame and causes it to appear to be part of a valid page.
|
|
|
An open redirect vulnerability in the search script in the software allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL as a parameter to the proper function.
|
|
|
Open redirect vulnerability in the software allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL in the proper parameter.
|
|
| Method | Details |
|---|---|
|
Manual Static Analysis |
Since this weakness does not typically appear frequently within a single software package, manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all potentially-vulnerable operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High |
|
Automated Dynamic Analysis |
Automated black box tools that supply URLs to every input may be able to spot Location header modifications, but test case coverage is a factor, and custom redirects may not be detected.
|
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis tools may not be able to determine whether input influences the beginning of a URL, which is important for reducing false positives.
|
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness: High |
|
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Effectiveness: High |
|
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Effectiveness: High |
|
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Effectiveness: High |
|
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Effectiveness: High |
|
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Effectiveness: High |
|
Architecture or Design Review |
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: High |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 722 | OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 801 | 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 819 | OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 864 | 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components |
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 938 | OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 990 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1345 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1382 | ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.Other
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| WASC | 38 | URl Redirector Abuse | |
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP24 | Tainted input to command |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-178 | Cross-Site Flashing |
| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2007年05月07日
(CWE Draft 6, 2007年05月07日) |
Anonymous Tool Vendor (under NDA) | ||
| Contributions | |||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
|
2023年11月25日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) |
Michal Biesiada | ||
| suggested that CWE include drive-by downloads and contributed references | |||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2025年09月09日
(CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References | |||
|
2024年11月19日
(CWE 4.16, 2024年11月19日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes | |||
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2022年10月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples | |||
| 2022年04月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2020年06月25日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2020年02月24日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
| 2019年06月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Type | |||
| 2019年01月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2017年11月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2015年12月07日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2014年07月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2013年07月17日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References, Relationships | |||
| 2012年10月30日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2012年05月11日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2011年09月13日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, References | |||
| 2011年06月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2011年06月01日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
| 2010年09月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2010年06月21日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | |||
| 2010年04月05日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
| 2010年02月16日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2009年12月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations | |||
| 2009年05月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Name | |||
| 2009年03月10日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2008年10月14日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples, References | |||
| 2008年10月03日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated References and Observed_Examples | |||
| 2008年09月08日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Background_Details, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Relationships, Observed_Example, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
| 2008年07月01日 | Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2008年04月11日 | Unsafe URL Redirection | ||
| 2008年09月09日 | URL Redirection to Untrusted Site | ||
| 2009年05月27日 | URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (aka 'Open Redirect') | ||
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