CWE - CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information (4.18)

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CWE Glossary Definition

CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Weakness ID: 319

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.

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Description

The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Diagram for CWE-319

Common Consequences

Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Impact	Details
Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories	Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality Anyone can read the information by gaining access to the channel being used for communication. Many communication channels can be "sniffed" (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.
Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories; Other	Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to "sniff" the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.

Impact

Details

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

Anyone can read the information by gaining access to the channel being used for communication. Many communication channels can be "sniffed" (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.

Read Application Data; Modify Files or Directories; Other

Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality

When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to "sniff" the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.

Potential Mitigations

Phase(s)	Mitigation
Architecture and Design	Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols.
Implementation	When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page.
Implementation	When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications.
Testing	Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Operation	Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols.

Relationships

Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
ParentOf	Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	5	J2EE Misconfiguration: Data Transmission Without Encryption
ParentOf	Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	614	Sensitive Cookie in HTTPS Session Without 'Secure' Attribute
ParentOf	Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	1428	Reliance on HTTP instead of HTTPS

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	199	Information Management Errors

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data

Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1013	Encrypt Data

Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1207	Debug and Test Problems

Modes Of Introduction

Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design	OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Architecture and Design	For hardware, this may be introduced when design does not plan for an attacker having physical access while a legitimate user is remotely operating the device.
Operation
System Configuration

Applicable Platforms

Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent)

Class: System on Chip (Undetermined Prevalence)

Test/Debug Hardware (Often Prevalent)

Likelihood Of Exploit

High

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information.

(bad code)

Example Language: Java

try {

URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/");
HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection();
hu.setRequestMethod("PUT");
hu.connect();
OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream();
hu.disconnect();

}
catch (IOException e) {

//...

}

Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors.

Example 2

In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used cleartext transmission of sensitive information in their OT products.

Example 3

A TAP accessible register is read/written by a JTAG based tool, for internal use by authorized users. However, an adversary can connect a probing device and collect the values from the unencrypted channel connecting the JTAG interface to the authorized user, if no additional protections are employed.

Example 4

The following Azure CLI command lists the properties of a particular storage account:

(informative)

Example Language: Shell

az storage account show -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName}

The JSON result might be:

(bad code)

Example Language: JSON

{

"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": false,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"

}

The enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is set to false, because the default setting for Secure transfer is set to Disabled. This allows cloud storage resources to successfully connect and transfer data without the use of encryption (e.g., HTTP, SMB 2.1, SMB 3.0, etc.).

Azure's storage accounts can be configured to only accept requests from secure connections made over HTTPS. The secure transfer setting can be enabled using Azure's Portal (GUI) or programmatically by setting the enableHttpsTrafficOnly property to True on the storage account, such as:

(good code)

Example Language: Shell

az storage account update -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName} --https-only true

The change can be confirmed from the result by verifying that the enableHttpsTrafficOnly value is true:

(good code)

Example Language: JSON

{

"name": "{StorageAccountName}",
"enableHttpsTrafficOnly": true,
"type": "Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts"

}

Note: to enable secure transfer using Azure's Portal instead of the command line:

Open the Create storage account pane in the Azure portal.
In the Advanced page, select the Enable secure transfer checkbox.

Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference	Description
CVE-2022-29519	Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends sensitive information in plaintext, including passwords and session tokens.
CVE-2022-30312	Building Controller uses a protocol that transmits authentication credentials in plaintext.
CVE-2022-31204	Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends password in plaintext.
CVE-2002-1949	Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
CVE-2008-4122	Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
CVE-2008-3289	Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
CVE-2008-4390	Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
CVE-2007-5626	Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
CVE-2004-1852	Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
CVE-2008-0374	Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
CVE-2007-4961	Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
CVE-2007-4786	Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
CVE-2005-3140	Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.

Detection Methods

Method	Details
Black Box	Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic. Attach the monitor to the process, trigger the feature that sends the data, and look for the presence or absence of common cryptographic functions in the call tree. Monitor the network and determine if the data packets contain readable commands. Tools exist for detecting if certain encodings are in use. If the traffic contains high entropy, this might indicate the usage of encryption.
Automated Static Analysis	Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) Effectiveness: High

Method

Details

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process, trigger the feature that sends the data, and look for the presence or absence of common cryptographic functions in the call tree. Monitor the network and determine if the data packets contain readable commands. Tools exist for detecting if certain encodings are in use. If the traffic contains high entropy, this might indicate the usage of encryption.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Memberships

Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	751	2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	818	OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A9 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	858	The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 15 - Serialization (SER)
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	859	The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf	ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	934	OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	963	SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1029	OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1148	SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 14. Serialization (SER)
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1346	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1366	ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf	CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1402	Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage ALLOWED

(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Notes

Other

Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product's threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries.

Maintenance

The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit
PLOVER	Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)	SEC06-J	Do not rely on the default automatic signature verification provided by URLClassLoader and java.util.jar
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)	SER02-J	Sign then seal sensitive objects before sending them outside a trust boundary
Software Fault Patterns	SFP23	Exposed Data
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 3-3	Req SR 4.1
ISA/IEC 62443	Part 4-2	Req CR 4.1B

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-102	Session Sidejacking
CAPEC-117	Interception
CAPEC-383	Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring
CAPEC-477	Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
CAPEC-65	Sniff Application Code

References

[REF-271] OWASP. "Top 10 2007-Insecure Communications". 2007.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20160319230109/http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A9>. (URL validated: 2025年08月04日)

[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002年12月04日.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.

[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 22: Failing to Protect Network Traffic." Page 337. McGraw-Hill. 2010.

[REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010年12月13日.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023年04月07日)

[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022年06月20日.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.

[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Sections 3.1 and 3.10. 2022年08月16日.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023年01月19日)

[REF-1309] Microsoft. "Require secure transfer to ensure secure connections". 2022年07月24日.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-require-secure-transfer>. (URL validated: 2023年01月24日)

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006年07月19日 (CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日)	PLOVER
2006年07月19日 (CWE Draft 3, 2006年07月19日)
Contributions
Contribution Date	Contributor	Organization
2023年01月24日	Accellera IP Security Assurance (IPSA) Working Group	Accellera Systems Initiative
2023年01月24日	Submitted original contents of CWE-1324 and reviewed its integration into this entry.
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2025年09月09日 (CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2025年09月09日 (CWE 4.18, 2025年09月09日)	updated References
2025年04月03日 (CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2025年04月03日 (CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日)	updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Relationships
2024年02月29日 (CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2024年02月29日 (CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日)	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023年06月29日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023年06月29日	updated Description, Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023年04月27日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023年04月27日	updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships
2023年01月31日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023年01月31日	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2022年10月13日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022年10月13日	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
2022年06月28日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022年06月28日	updated Relationships
2021年10月28日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021年10月28日	updated Relationships
2020年02月24日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020年02月24日	updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2019年06月20日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019年06月20日	updated Relationships, Type
2019年01月03日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019年01月03日	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018年03月27日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2018年03月27日	updated References, Relationships, Type
2018年01月23日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2018年01月23日	updated Abstraction
2017年11月08日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017年11月08日	updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017年05月03日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017年05月03日	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014年07月30日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014年07月30日	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2014年06月23日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014年06月23日	updated Relationships
2014年02月18日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014年02月18日	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2013年07月17日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2013年07月17日	updated Relationships
2013年02月21日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2013年02月21日	updated Applicable_Platforms, References
2012年05月11日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012年05月11日	updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011年06月01日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011年06月01日	updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011年03月29日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011年03月29日	updated Potential_Mitigations
2010年12月13日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010年12月13日	updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010年06月21日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010年06月21日	updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2010年04月05日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010年04月05日	updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Time_of_Introduction
2010年02月16日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010年02月16日	updated References
2009年05月27日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009年05月27日	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2009年03月10日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009年03月10日	updated Potential_Mitigations
2009年01月12日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009年01月12日	updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008年09月08日	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008年09月08日	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008年07月01日	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008年07月01日	updated Time_of_Introduction
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2009年01月12日	Plaintext Transmission of Sensitive Information

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Page Last Updated: September 09, 2025

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