Adversaries could bypass the secure-boot process and execute their own untrusted, malicious boot code.
As a part of a secure-boot process, the read-only-memory (ROM) code for a System-on-Chip (SoC) or other system fetches bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) and stores the code in Volatile Memory (VM), such as dynamic, random-access memory (DRAM) or static, random-access memory (SRAM). The NVM is usually external to the SoC, while the VM is internal to the SoC. As the code is transferred from NVM to VM, it is authenticated by the SoC's ROM code.
If the volatile-memory-region protections or access controls are insufficient to prevent modifications from an adversary or untrusted agent, the secure boot may be bypassed or replaced with the execution of an adversary's code.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control, Integrity Likelihood: High |
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Architecture and Design |
Ensure that the design of volatile-memory protections is enough to prevent modification from an adversary or untrusted code.
|
|
Testing |
Test the volatile-memory protections to ensure they are safe from modification or untrusted code.
|
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf | Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. | 284 | Improper Access Control |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1196 | Security Flow Issues |
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | This weakness can be introduced during hardware architecture or design but can be identified later during testing. |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
A typical SoC secure boot's flow includes fetching the next piece of code (i.e., the boot loader) from NVM (e.g., serial, peripheral interface (SPI) flash), and transferring it to DRAM/SRAM volatile, internal memory, which is more efficient.
The memory from where the boot loader executes can be modified by an adversary.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Locked memory regions may be modified through other interfaces in a secure-boot-loader image due to improper access control.
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Primary
|
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
|
| Method | Details |
|---|---|
|
Manual Analysis |
Ensure the volatile memory is lockable or has locks. Ensure the volatile memory is locked for writes from untrusted agents or adversaries. Try modifying the volatile memory from an untrusted agent, and ensure these writes are dropped.
Effectiveness: High |
|
Manual Analysis |
Analyze the device using the following steps:
Only trusted masters should be allowed to write to the memory regions. For example, pluggable device peripherals should not have write access to program load memory regions. Effectiveness: Moderate |
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). | 1343 | Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List |
| MemberOf | CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. | 1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.| Submissions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
|
2020年04月25日
(CWE 4.1, 2020年02月24日) |
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | |
| Contributions | |||
| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
| 2021年10月20日 | Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Lattice Semiconductor | |
| suggested content improvements | |||
| 2021年10月22日 | Hareesh Khattri | Intel Corporation | |
| provided detection method | |||
| Modifications | |||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
|
2025年04月03日
(CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
|
2024年02月29日
(CWE 4.14, 2024年02月29日) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Detection_Factors | |||
| 2023年06月29日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes | |||
| 2023年04月27日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
| 2023年01月31日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2022年04月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| 2021年10月28日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities | |||
| 2020年08月20日 | CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns | |||
| Previous Entry Names | |||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2021年10月28日 | Insufficient Protections on the Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code | ||
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