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Home > CWE List > CWE-1243: Sensitive Non-Volatile Information Not Protected During Debug (4.18)
ID
CWE Glossary Definition

CWE-1243: Sensitive Non-Volatile Information Not Protected During Debug

Weakness ID: 1243
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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Description
Access to security-sensitive information stored in fuses is not limited during debug.
Extended Description

Several security-sensitive values are programmed into fuses to be used during early-boot flows or later at runtime. Examples of these security-sensitive values include root keys, encryption keys, manufacturing-specific information, chip-manufacturer-specific information, and original-equipment-manufacturer (OEM) data. After the chip is powered on, these values are sensed from fuses and stored in temporary locations such as registers and local memories. These locations are typically access-control protected from untrusted agents capable of accessing them. Even to trusted agents, only read-access is provided. However, these locations are not blocked during debug operations, allowing a user to access this sensitive information.

Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Impact Details

Modify Memory; Bypass Protection Mechanism

Scope: Confidentiality, Access Control

Potential Mitigations
Phase(s) Mitigation

Architecture and Design; Implementation

Disable access to security-sensitive information stored in fuses directly and also reflected from temporary storage locations when in debug mode.
Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 1263 Improper Physical Access Control
Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1207 Debug and Test Problems
Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Operating Systems

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Architectures

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1


Sensitive manufacturing data (such as die information) are stored in fuses. When the chip powers on, these values are read from the fuses and stored in microarchitectural registers. These registers are only given read access to trusted software running on the core. Untrusted software running on the core is not allowed to access these registers.

(bad code)
Example Language: Other
All microarchitectural registers in this chip can be accessed through the debug interface. As a result, even an untrusted debugger can access this data and retrieve sensitive manufacturing data.
(good code)
Example Language: Other
Registers used to store sensitive values read from fuses should be blocked during debug. These registers should be disconnected from the debug interface.


Example 2


The example code below is taken from one of the AES cryptographic accelerators of the HACK@DAC'21 buggy OpenPiton SoC [REF-1366]. The operating system (OS) uses three AES keys to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data using this accelerator. These keys are sensitive data stored in fuses. The security of the OS will be compromised if any of these AES keys are leaked. During system bootup, these AES keys are sensed from fuses and stored in temporary hardware registers of the AES peripheral. Access to these temporary registers is disconnected during the debug state to prevent them from leaking through debug access. In this example (see the vulnerable code source), the registers key0, key1, and key2 are used to store the three AES keys (which are accessed through key_big0, key_big1, and key_big2 signals). The OS selects one of these three keys through the key_big signal, which is used by the AES engine.

(bad code)
Example Language: Verilog
...
assign key_big0 = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key0[0],
key0[1], key0[2], key0[3], key0[4], key0[5]};

assign key_big1 = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key1[0],
key1[1], key1[2], key1[3], key1[4], key1[5]};

assign key_big2 = {key2[0], key2[1], key2[2],
key2[3], key2[4], key2[5]};
...
assign key_big = key_sel[1] ? key_big2 : ( key_sel[0] ?
key_big1 : key_big0 );
...

The above code illustrates an instance of a vulnerable implementation for blocking AES key mechanism when the system is in debug mode (i.e., when debug_mode_i is asserted). During debug mode, key accesses through key_big0 and key_big1 are effectively disconnected, as their values are set to zero. However, the key accessed via the key_big2 signal remains accessible, creating a potential pathway for sensitive fuse data leakage, specifically AES key2, during debug mode. Furthermore, even though it is not strictly necessary to disconnect the key_big signal when entering debug mode (since disconnecting key_big0, key_big1, and key_big2 will inherently disconnect key_big), it is advisable, in line with the defense-in-depth strategy, to also sever the connection to key_big. This additional security measure adds an extra layer of protection and safeguards the AES keys against potential future modifications to the key_big logic.

To mitigate this, disconnect access through key_big2 and key_big during debug mode [REF-1367].

(good code)
Example Language: Verilog
...
assign key_big0 = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key0[0],
key0[1], key0[2], key0[3], key0[4], key0[5]};

assign key_big1 = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key1[0],
key1[1], key1[2], key1[3], key1[4], key1[5]};

assign key_big2 = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : {key2[0],
key2[1], key2[2], key2[3], key2[4], key2[5]};
...
assign key_big = debug_mode_i ? 192'b0 : ( key_sel[1] ?
key_big2 : ( key_sel[0] ? key_big1 : key_big0 ) );
...


Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
Usage ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason Acceptable-Use

Rationale

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Content History
Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2020年02月12日
(CWE 4.0, 2020年02月24日) 		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
Contributions
Contribution Date Contributor Organization
2023年06月21日 Chen Chen, Rahul Kande, Jeyavijayan Rajendran Texas A&M University
suggested demonstrative example
2023年06月21日 Shaza Zeitouni, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Technical University of Darmstadt
suggested demonstrative example
Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2025年04月03日
(CWE 4.17, 2025年04月03日) 		CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2023年10月26日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2023年06月29日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
2023年04月27日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022年10月13日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021年07月20日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2021年03月15日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description
2020年08月20日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2020年06月25日 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2020年08月20日 Exposure of Security-Sensitive Fuse Values During Debug
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Page Last Updated: September 09, 2025

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